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Abstract
Terrorist organizations change over time because of processes such as recruit-
ment and training as well as counter-terrorism (CT) measures, but the effects of
these processes are typically studied qualitatively and in separation from each
other. Seeking a more quantitative and integrated understanding, we constructed
a simple dynamic model where equations describe how these processes change an
organization’s membership. Analysis of the model yields a number of intuitive as
well as novel findings. Most importantly it becomes possible to predict whether
counter-terrorism measures would be sufficient to defeat the organization. Further-
more, we can prove in general that an organization would collapse if its strength
and its pool of foot soldiers decline simultaneously. In contrast, a simultaneous
decline in its strength and its pool of leaders is often insufficient and short-termed.
These results and other like them demonstrate the great potential of dynamic mod-
els for informing terrorism scholarship and counter-terrorism policy making.
1 Introduction
Our goal is to study terrorist organizations using a dynamic model. Generally speak-
ing, in such a model a phenomenon is represented as a set of equations which describe
it in simplified terms. The equations represent how the phenomenon changes in time
or space, and cast our empirically-based knowledge in precise mathematical language.
Once the model is constructed, it can be studied using powerful mathematical tech-
niques to yield predictions, observations and insights that are difficult or impossible
to collect empirically (Aris, 2005; Ellner and Guckenheimer, 2006). For example, a
dynamic model could be constructed for the various militant groups operating in Iraq
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and then used to predict their strength a year in the future. Moreover, given the model,
it would be possible to evaluate the efficacy of various counter-insurgency policies.
Mathematical models can help fill a large methodological void in terrorism re-
search: the lack of model systems. Whereas biologists studying pathogens can do
experiments in vitro, there are no such model systems in terrorism research, except
for mathematical models. In this sense, the method developed below provides an in
vitro form of terrorism, which can be investigated in ways not possible in its in vivo
kind. Like all model systems, mathematical models are imperfect because they rely
on large simplifications of the underlying political phenomena, and one can rightfully
ask whether their predictions would be sufficiently accurate. Fortunately, complex
phenomena in fields like biology have been studied very successfully with this math-
ematical technique (Ellner and Guckenheimer, 2006). Therefore, even phenomena as
complex as found in terrorism research may, in some cases, be productively studied
using mathematical models and indeed, previous models have brought considerable
insights1.
In the rest of the paper we describe a simple model of a terrorist organization. The
model is new in its focus, methodology and audience: We focus on a single terror-
ist organization and model its processes of recruitment, its internal dynamics as well
as the impact of counter-terrorism measures on it. As to methodology, with a few
exceptions (Chamberlain, 2007; Feichtinger et al., 2001; Stauffer and Sahimi, 2006;
Udwadia et al., 2006) and perhaps a few others the powerful mathematical technique
of differential equations has not been applied in terrorism research. Finally, the pa-
per is specifically written to an audience of non-mathematicians: the main body of the
paper uses non-technical language to explain the terminology and to describe the equa-
tions and assumptions used in the model, while the technical analysis is exposed in the
appendix.
The model described below was built following two design principles. First, it
was desired to have a model of broad applicability across organizations and conflicts.
Indeed, the model is so general that it can be applied to insurgencies or even to some
non-terrorist organizations. As we shall see, despite this generality it makes non-trivial
observations and more importantly it specifies sufficient conditions for victory over the
organization (see subsection 4.2). Second, it was desired to build a simple model so
as to facilitate interpretation, analysis and further development. It was hoped that the
1E.g. dynamic models: Allanach et al. (2004); Chamberlain (2007); Farley (2007); Feichtinger et al.
(2001); Johnson et al. (2006); Stauffer and Sahimi (2006); Udwadia et al. (2006), rational choice models:
Anderton and Carter (2005); Sandler et al. (1983); Sandler (2003); Wintrobe (2006), agent-based models:
MacKerrow (2003); Tsvetovat and Carley (2007).
2
model would establish a methodological prototype that could be easily extended and
modified to fit specific cases.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model - its
variables, parameters and relations between them. Section 3 graphically illustrates
the model’s predictions about terrorist organizations. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the
insights gleaned from the model, and the implications to counter-terrorism policies.
The conclusions are in Section 6. Finally, all of the technical arguments are gathered
in the appendix.
2 A Mathematical Model
There are many ways of describing a terrorist organization, such as its ideology or
political platform, its operational patterns, or its methods of recruitment. Here we
consider it from the “human resources” point of view. Namely, we are interested in ex-
amining how the numbers of “leaders” and “foot soldiers” in the organization change
with time. The former includes experienced managers, weapon experts, financiers and
even politicians and religious leaders who help the organization, while the latter are the
more numerous rank-and-file. These two quantities arguably give the most important
information about the strength of the organization. The precise characteristics of the
two groups and their relative sizes would depend on the organization under consid-
eration. Nevertheless, this distinction remains relevant even in the very decentralized
organizations like the post-Afghanistan al-Qaeda movement, because we can identify
the “leaders” as the experienced terrorists, as compared to the new recruits (see dis-
cussions in Hoffman, 2003; Sageman, 2004). The division between those two groups
is also important in practice because decision makers often need to choose which of
the groups to target (Wolf, 1989; Ganor, 2005, Ch.5): while the leaders represent more
valuable targets, they are also harder to reach. Later on in section 5 we actually com-
pare the policy alternatives.
Therefore, let us represent a terrorist organization as two time-varying quantities, L
and F , corresponding to the number of leaders and foot soldiers, respectively. Also, L
and F determine the overall “strength” S of the organization. Because leaders possess
valuable skills and experience, they contribute more to the strength than an equivalent
number of foot soldiers. Hence, strength S is taken to be a weighted sum of the two
variables, with more weight (m > 1) given to leaders:
S = mL+ F
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We now identify a set of processes that are fundamental in changing the numbers of
leaders and foot soldiers. These processes constitute the mathematical model. While
some of them are self-evident, others could benefit from quantitative comparison with
data. The latter task is non-trivial given the scarcity of time-series data on membership
in terrorist organizations and hence we leave it out for future work.
The histories of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations (e.g. Laqueur, 2001;
Harmon, 2000; Hoffman, 2006) suggest that the pool of terrorist leaders and experts
grows primarily when foot soldiers acquire battle experience or receive training (in-
ternally, or in terrorist-supporting states, Jongman and Schmid, 2005). Consequently,
the pool of leaders (L) is provisioned with new leaders at a rate proportional to the
number of foot soldiers (F ). We call this process “promotion” and label the parameter
of proportionality p. This growth is opposed by internal personnel loss due to demo-
tivation, fatigue, desertion as well as in-fighting and splintering (Horgan, 2005, Ch.6).
This phenomenon is modeled as a loss of a fraction (d) of the pool of leaders per unit
time. An additional important influence on the organization are the counter-terrorism
(CT) measures targeted specifically at the leadership, including arrests, assassinations
as well as efforts to disrupt communications and to force the leaders into long-term
inactivity. Such measures could be modeled as the removal of a certain number (b)
of people per unit time from the pool of leaders. CT is modeled as a constant rate
of removal rather than as a quantity that depends on the size of the organization be-
cause the goal is to see how a fixed resource allocation towards CT would impact the
organization. Presumably, the human resources and funds available to fight the given
terrorist organization lead, on average, to the capture or elimination of a fixed number
of operatives. In sum, we assume that on average, at every interval of time the pool of
leaders is nourished through promotion, and drained because of internal losses and CT
(see appendix, equation (1).)
The dynamics of the pool of foot soldiers (F ) are somewhat similar to the dynamics
of leaders. Like in the case of leaders, some internal losses are expected. This is mod-
eled as the removal of a fraction (d) of the pool of operatives per unit time where for
simplicity the rate d is the same as the rate for leaders (the complex case is discussed
in subsection 5.2.) Much like in the case of leaders above, counter-terrorism measures
are assumed to remove a fixed number (k) of foot soldiers per unit time. Finally and
most importantly, we need to consider how and why new recruits join a terrorist orga-
nization. Arguably, in many organizations growth in the ranks is in proportion to the
strength of the organization, for multiple reasons: Strength determines the ability to
carry out successful operations, which increase interest in the organization and its mis-
sion. Moreover, strength gives the organization the manpower to publicize its attacks,
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as well as to man and fund recruitment activities. By assuming that recruitment is
proportional to strength, we capture the often-seen cycle where successful attacks lead
to greater recruitment, which leads to greater strength and more attacks. Overall, the
pool of foot soldiers is nourished through recruitment, and drained because of internal
losses and CT (see appendix, equation (2))2,3.
The numerical values of all of the above parameters (p, d, b, r,m, k) are depen-
dent on the particular organization under consideration, and likely vary somewhat with
time4. Fortunately, it is possible to draw many general conclusions from the model
without knowing the parameter values, and we shall do so shortly. Finally, it should be
noted that counter-terrorism need not be restricted to the parameters b, k (removal of
leaders and foot soldiers, respectively), and measures such as public advocacy, attacks
on terrorist bases, disruption of communication and others can weaken the organization
by reducing its capabilities as expressed through the other parameters.
In the above description, we assumed that counter-terrorism measures are param-
eters that can be changed without affecting recruitment. This is a significant simpli-
fication because in practice it may be difficult to respond to terrorist attacks without
engendering a backlash that actually promotes recruitment (see e.g. Ganor, 2008;
Hanson and Schmidt, 2007). Nevertheless, the advantages of this simplification out-
weigh the disadvantages: Firstly, it is clear that any model that would consider such
an effect would be much more complicated than the current model and consequently
much harder to analyze or use. Secondly, the current model can be easily extended to
incorporate such an effect if desired. Thirdly, the strength of this effect is difficult to
describe in general because it depends extensively on factors such as the the specific
CT measures being used, the terrorist actions and the political environment. Indeed,
Udwadia et al. (2006) who incorporated this effect, constructed their model based on
observations of a specific context within the current conflict in Iraq.
The model includes additional implicit assumptions. First, it assumes a state of sta-
ble gradual change, such that the effect of one terrorist or counter-terrorism operation is
2A minor assumption in our model is that once a foot soldier is promoted a new foot soldier is recruited
as a replacement. It is shown in the appendix that if in some organizations such recruitment is not automatic,
then the current model is still valid for these organizations as long as p < r. In any case the drain due
to promotion is marginal because foot soldiers are far more numerous than leaders even in relatively “top
heavy” organizations.
3This model is similar to structured population models in biology, where the foot soldiers are the “larvae”
and the leaders are the “adults”. However, an interesting difference is that whereas larvae growth is a function
of the adult population alone, in a terrorist organization the pool of foot soldiers contributes to its own growth.
4The simplest approach to estimating them would be to estimate the number and leaders and foot soldiers
at some point in time, and then find the parameter values by doing least-squares fitting of the model to the
data on the terrorist attacks, where we consider the terrorist attacks to be a proxy of strength. However, this
approach has some limitations.
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smoothed. This should be acceptable in all cases where the terrorist organization is not
very small and thus changes are not very stochastic. Second, the model assumes that an
organization’s growth is constrained only by the available manpower, and factors such
as money or weapons do not impose an independent constraint. Third, it is assumed
that the growth in foot soldiers is not constrained by the availability of potential recruits
- and it is probably true in the case of al-Qaeda because willing recruits are plentiful
(for the case of England, see Manningham-Buller, 2006). We discuss this point further
in subsection 4.3.
3 Analysis of the Model
Having written down the governing equations, the task of studying a terrorist organiza-
tion is reduced to the standard problem of studying solutions to the equations. Because
the equations indicate rates of change in time, the solutions would be two functions,
L(t) and F (t), giving the number of leaders and foot soldiers, respectively, at each
time. Let us suppose that currently (time 0) the organization has a certain number of
leaders and foot soldiers, L0 and F0, respectively and is subject to certain CT measures,
quantified by b and k. We want to see whether the CT measures are adequate to defeat
the organization. Mathematically, this corresponds to the question of whether at some
future time both L and F would reach zero. Intuitively, we expect that the organiza-
tion would be eliminated if it is incapable of recovering from the losses inflicted on it
by CT. In turn, this would depend on its current capabilities as well as the parameters
p, d, r,m which characterize the organization.
Mathematical analysis of the model (see the appendix) shows that most terrorist
organizations5 evolve in time like the organizations whose “orbits” are displayed in
Fig. 1(a,b). In Fig. 1(a) we plotted eight different organizations with different starting
conditions. Another perspective can be seen in Fig. 1(b) which graphically illustrates
the dynamical equations via arrows: the direction of each arrow and its length indicate
how an organization at the tail of the arrow would be changing and it what rate. By
picking any starting location (L0, F0) and connecting the arrows, it is possible to visu-
ally predict the evolution into the future. Another illustration is found in Fig. 2, which
shows how two example organizations change with time.
5That is, those with realistically low rates of desertion: d < 1
2
(r + r
q
1 + mp
r
). A higher rate of
desertion d always causes the organization to collapse and is not as interesting from a policy perspective (see
subsection 5.2 for a discussion of desertion).
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Figure 1 – (a) Typical solution curves of the equations coded by ultimate fate: thin blue
for successfully neutralized organizations and thick red for those remaining operational
and growing. The parameters were set to representative values, but as was said earlier, all
realistic organizations are qualitatively similar and resemble these. (b) “Vector field” of L
and F . At each value of L,F the direction and length of the arrow give the rate of change
in L and F .
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Figure 2 – Evolution of strength, leaders and foot soldiers (S,L, F , respectively) in two
terrorist organizations as a function of time. In (a), due to CT,F falls initially but eventually
the organization recovers through promotion. In (b), L and S fall initially but eventually the
organization recovers through recruitment. The vertical axis has been rescaled by dividing
each quantity by the maximum it attains during the time evolution. This makes it possible
to represent all three quantities on the same plot. The units of time are unspecified since
they do not affect the analysis. Of course, in a more complex model it would be desirable
to consider periodic events like election cycles or generational changes.
In general, it is found that the dynamics of the organization is dependent upon the
position of the organization with respect to a threshold line, which can be termed the
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“sink line”: an organization will be neutralized if and only if its capabilities are below
the sink line. In other words, the current CT measures are sufficient if and only if
the organization lies below that threshold (thick red line on Fig. 3). The threshold is
impassable: an organization above it will grow, and one below it is sure to collapse.
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Figure 3 – Plot of the sink (thick red) and
trend lines (thin dashed black). The two
lines intersect at a “saddle point”.
This threshold is also very sharp: two or-
ganizations may lie close to the line, but
the one above it would grow, while the
one below it would shrink even if the dif-
ferences in initial capabilities are small.
In addition to the sink line, the model
also predicts that all successful organiza-
tions would tend towards a particular tra-
jectory. This “trend line” (a dashed black
line on Fig. 3) is discussed further in sub-
section 4.1.
Suppose now that the model predicts
that the given organization is expected to
grow further despite the current CT mea-
sures, and therefore increased CT measures would be needed to defeat it. To see the ef-
fect of additional CT measures, we need to examine how the dynamical system changes
in response to increases in the values of the parameters, in particular, the parameters b
and k which express the CT measures directed at leaders and foot soldiers, respectively
(Fig. 4).
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Figure 4 – The effects of the parameters b and k on the dynamical system, (a) and (b)
respectively, as seen through the effect on the sink line. In each case, as the CT measures
are increased, the sink line moves up confining below it additional terrorist organizations.
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It is also possible to affect the fate of the organization by influencing the values of
other parameters affecting its evolution, such as recruitment and promotion (Fig. 5).
In general, to bring the terrorist organization under control it is necessary to change
the parameters individually or simultaneously so that the organization’s current state,
(L,F ), is trapped under the sink line. An interesting finding in this domain is that both
b and k are equivalent in the sense that both shift the sink link up in parallel (Fig. 4).
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Figure 5 – The effects of the parameters p (a), r (b) and d (c) on the dynamical system as
seen through the effect on the sink line. When p or r are increased the organizations are able
to grow faster, causing the sink line to move down, making the existing CT measures no
longer sufficient to neutralize some terrorist organizations. In contrast, when d is increased,
the sink line moves up because the organization is forced to replace more internal loses to
survive.
4 Discussion
4.1 Nascent terrorist organizations
Recall that the sink line (Fig. 3) distinguishes two classes of terrorist organizations
- those destined to be neutralized and those that will continue growing indefinitely.
Within the latter group, another distinction is introduced by the trend line - a distinc-
tion with significance to counter-terrorism efforts: organizations lying to the left of it
have different initial growth patterns compared to those lying to the right (Fig. 1). The
former start with a large base of foot soldiers and a relatively small core of leaders.
In these organizations, F may initially decline because of CT, but the emergence of
competent leaders would then start organizational growth (e.g. Fig. 2(a)). In contrast,
the latter type of organizations start with a large pool of leaders but comparatively few
recruits. CT could decimate their leadership, but they would develop a wide pool of
foot soldiers, recover and grow (e.g. Fig. 2(b)). Thus, all successful terrorist organi-
zations may be classified as either “p-types” (to the left of the trend line) or “r-types”
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(to the right of the trend line) in reference to the parameters p of promotion and r of
recruitment. In p-type organizations early growth occurs mainly through promotion of
their foot soldiers to leaders, while in the r-types mainly through recruitment of new
foot soldiers.
This classification could be applied to many actual organizations. For example,
popular insurgencies are clearly p-type, while al-Qaeda’s history since the late 1990s
closely follows the profile of an r-type: Al-Qaeda may be said to have evolved through
three stages: First, a core of followers moved with bin Laden to Afghanistan. They
were well-trained but the organization had few followers in the wider world (for a his-
tory see Wright, Wright). Then the attacks and counter-attacks in the Fall of 2001
reduced the organization’s presence in Afghanistan leaving its operatives outside the
country with few leaders or skills. Finally the organization cultivated a wide interna-
tional network of foot soldiers but they were ill-trained as compared to their predeces-
sors. This description closely matches the profiles in Fig. 1 where r-type organizations
start from a small well-trained core, move toward a smaller ratio of leaders to foot
soldiers and then grow through recruitment.
As was noted, nascent organizations tend towards the trend line, regardless of how
they started (Fig. 1). The slope of this line is r+
√
r2+4rmp
2p , and this number is the long-
term ratio between the number of foot soldiers and the number of leaders. Notice that
this formula implies that ratio is dependent on just the parameters of growth - r,m, p
- and does not depend on either d or the CT measures k, b. This ratio is generally not
found in failing organizations, but is predicted to be ubiquitous in successful organi-
zations. It may be possible to estimate it by capturing a division of an organization
and it can help calculate the model’s parameters. However, it is important to note that
L includes not just commanding officers, but also any individuals with substantially
superior skills and experience. The existence of the ratio is a prediction of the model,
and if the other parameters are known, it could be compared to empirical findings.
4.2 Conditions for Victory
Recall, that the model indicates that all terrorist organizations belong to one of three
classes: r-types, p-types and organizations that will be defeated. Each class exhibits
characteristic changes in its leaders, foot soldiers and strength (L,F and S resp.) over
time. This makes it possible to determine whether any given organization belongs to
the third class, i.e., to predict whether it would be defeated.
One finding is that if a terrorist organization weakens, i.e. shows a decline in its
strength S, it does not follow that it would be defeated. Indeed, in some r-type orga-
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nizations it is possible to observe a temporary weakening of the organization and yet
unless counter-terrorism (CT) measures are increased, the organization would recover
and grow out of control (see Fig. 2(b)). Even a decline in the leadership is not by itself
sufficient to guarantee victory. The underlying reason for this effect is out-of-control
growth in F , which would ultimately create a new generation of terrorist leaders. Simi-
larly, it is possible for an organization to experience a decline in its pool of foot soldiers
and yet recover. These cases indicate that it is easy during a CT campaign to incorrectly
perceive apparent progress in reducing the organization as a sign of imminent victory.
Fortunately, under the model it is possible to identify reliable conditions for victory
over the organization (see the appendix for the proof):
1. For a p-type organization, it is impossible to have a decline in strength S. If such
a decline is made to happen, the organization would be defeated.
2. For an r-type organization, it is impossible to have a decline in foot soldiers F .
If such a decline is made to happen, the organization would be defeated.
Consequently:
A terrorist organization would collapse if counter-terrorism measures pro-
duce both: (1) a decline in its strength S and (2) a decline in its foot
soldiers F .
In a notable contrast, declines in strength and the leaders are not sufficient in all cases
(see Fig. 2(b)). To apply the theorem to an organization of an unknown type, one needs
merely to estimate whether the organization’s pool of foot soldiers and strength are
declining. The latter could be found indirectly by looking at the quantity and quality
of terrorist operations. It is not necessary to know the model’s parameters or changes
in the pool of leaders - the latter could even be increasing. Furthermore, while it may
take some time to determine whether S and F are indeed declining, this time could
be much shorter compared to the lifetime of the organization. Therefore, the theorem
suggests the following two-step approach:
1. Estimate the scale of CT measures believed to be necessary to defeat the organi-
zation.
2. Measure the effect on S and F . If they both declined, then sustain the scale of
operations (i.e. do not reduce b, k); Otherwise an increase in CT measures would
be necessary.
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The theorem and findings above give sufficient conditions for victory but they do not
characterize the only possible victory scenario. For example, it is possible for an orga-
nization to see an increase in its pool of foot soldiers F yet ultimately collapse: these
are organizations that lie to the right of the trend line and just slightly under the sink
line. More generally, it should be remembered that to prove the theorem it was nec-
essary to use a simplified model of a terrorist organization, as described in section 2.
Nevertheless, it is likely that some form of the theorem would remain valid in com-
plicated models because the model is built on fundamental forces that are likely to be
retained in these models.
4.3 Stable Equilibria
Recall that the model does not have a stable equilibrium (Fig. 3). Yet, in many practical
cases, terrorist organization seem to reach a stable equilibrium in terms of their struc-
ture and capabilities. It is plausible that such stability is the result of a dynamic bal-
ance between the growing terrorist organization and increasing CT measures directed
against it. Indeed, rather than staying constant numbers like b, k, CT may actually grow
when the organization presents more of a threat6. Aside from CT, stability may be the
result of organizations reaching an external limit on their growth - a limit imposed
by constraints such as funding, training facilities or availability of recruits. The case
of funding could be modeled by assuming that the growth of the organization slows
as the organization approaches a maximum point, (Lmax, Fmax). Alternatively, it is
quite possible and consistent with the model that there would be a perception of stasis
because the organization is changing only slowly.
5 Counter-Terrorism Strategies
Recall that the general counter-terrorism (CT) strategy in this model is based on the
location of the sink line, which we want to place above the terrorist organization (in
Fig. 1). To implement this strategy, it is necessary first to calculate the model’s pa-
rameters for a given organization (p, r,m, d), and second, to determine the efficacy of
the current counter-terrorism measures (b, k). Then, it remains “just” to find the most
efficient way of changing those parameters so as to move the sink line into the desired
location. Let us now consider several strategic options.
6It would be a straightforward task to modify the model to incorporate such a control-theoretic interaction,
but the task is more properly the subject of a follow-up study.
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5.1 Targeting the leaders
An important “counter terrorist dilemma” (Ganor, 2005) is whom to target primarily -
the leaders or the foot soldiers. Foot soldiers are an inviting target: not only do they
do the vital grunt work of terrorism, they also form the pool of potential leaders, and
thus their elimination does quiet but important damage to the future of the organiza-
tion. Moreover, in subsection 4.1 we saw that while an organization can recover from a
decline in both its strength and leadership pool, it cannot recover from declines in both
its strength and its foot soldiers pool. That finding does not say that attacking leaders
is unlikely to bring victory - indeed, they form an important part of the organization’s
overall strength, but it does suggest that a sustained campaign against an organization is
more likely to be successful when it includes an offensive against its low-level person-
nel. Yet, it seems that the neutralization of a terrorist leader would be more profitable
since the leader is more valuable to the organization than a foot soldier, and his or her
loss would inevitably result in command and control difficulties that may even disrupt
terrorist attacks.
When we use the model to address the problem quantitatively, we find that the op-
timal strategy is actually dependent upon the organization, that is to say the parameters
p, d, r,m (but not on b, k). For example, for the parameter values used in the figures
above, an increase in b gives a greater rise in the sink line than an equal increase in
k. Specifically, for those parameter values every two units of b are equivalent to about
ten units of k. In general, when m, r, d are high but p is low then attack on the lead-
ership is favored, while attack on the foot soldiers is best when p is high but m, r, d
are low - in agreement with intuition7. In the first parameter range, foot soldiers are
recruited so rapidly that attacking them is futile, while in the second set leaders are
produced quickly so the only strategy is to fight the foot soldiers to prevent them from
becoming leaders. In any case, policy prescriptions of this kind must be applied with
consideration of counter-terrorism capabilities and policy costs. Thus, while on paper
a particular strategy is better, the other strategy could be more feasible.
It is often argued that counter-terrorism policies have considerable side effects. For
instance, there is evidence that targeted assassinations of leaders have led terrorist orga-
nizations to escalate, in what has been called the “boomerang effect” (Crenshaw, 1996,
p.125). Fortunately, the model suggests that the policy maker has useful substitutes,
with possibly fewer policy side effects. As Fig. 5 shows, making recruitment (r) lower
7Mathematically to obtain this result we first compute the derivatives of the fixed point with respect to
both b and k, then project them to the orthogonal to the sink link and then use an optimization solver to
find the parameter values of the model which maximize (and minimize) the ratio between the lengths of the
projections.
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has an effect similar to increasing k. Likewise, decreasing the rate of promotion to
leadership (p) can substitute for increasing b. This agrees with intuition: for example,
in the case of the foot soldiers, growth can be contained either actively through e.g. ar-
rests or proactively by slowing the recruitment of new operatives (through e.g. attacks
on recruitment facilities or advocacy).
5.2 Encouraging desertion
Fatigue and attrition of personnel have been empirically found to be an important ef-
fect in the evolution of terrorist organizations. In interviews with captured or retired
terrorists, they often complained about the psychological stress of their past work, its
moral contradictions, and the isolation from relatives and friends (Horgan, 2005, Ch.6).
This is part of the reason why terrorist organizations cannot remain inactive (as in a
cease fire) for very long without experiencing irreplaceable loss of personnel due to
loss of motivation, and many organizations even resort to coercion against desertion.
Therefore, encouraging operatives to leave through advocacy or amnesties may be an
effective counter-terrorism strategy.
The model introduced here brings theoretical insight into this phenomenon. One
prediction of the model is that even if such desertion exceeds recruitment (i.e. d > r)
the organization would still sustain itself as long as it has a sufficiently large rate of
promotion (p) or leaders of sufficiently high caliber (m). However, if d is even greater,
namely, exceeds d = 12 (r+ r
√
1 + mpr ), then the model predicts that the organization
would be destroyed regardless of starting conditions, or counter-terrorism efforts (b, k).
Organizations with lower d are, of course, also effected by desertion. Earlier, in
Fig. 5 we saw how increasing d raises up the sink line. To see the phenomenon in
more detail, we replaced d by two (not necessarily equal) parameters dL and dF for
the desertion of L and F , respectively. The two parameters change the slope of the
sink line: increasing dL flattens it, while increasing dF makes it more steep (Fig. 6).
Therefore, increasing dL could be a particularly effective strategy against nascent r-
type organizations, while increasing dF could be effective against the nascent p-types.
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Figure 6 – The effects of dL (a) and dF (b) on the dynamical system, as seen through the
effect on the sink line. As the desertion rates increase, the sink line moves up and its slope
changes, thus trapping additional terrorist organizations.
5.3 Minimization of Strength S
Counter terrorism (CT) is often the problem of resource allocation among competing
strategies. Therefore, suppose that resources have become available towards a CT op-
eration against the terrorist organization. Namely, suppose we can remove leaders and
operatives in a single blow (unlike the parameters b, k in the model which take a grad-
ual toll). A reasonable approach to allocating these resources efficiently would be to
divide them between operations targeting the leadership and those targeting the foot
soldiers in such a way that the terrorist organization’s strength S is minimized8. How-
ever, by some simplified economic analysis, it is possible to show (see appendix) that
this counter-terrorism strategy is in general suboptimal. Instead, for a truly effective
resource allocation, it is necessary to consider the dynamics of the organization being
targeted and the true optimum may be considerably different. For example, when the
ratio of promotion to recruitment is relatively large (i.e. pr  0), then the optimum
shifts increasingly towards attacking the foot soldiers since they become much harder
to replace than leaders.
On an intuitive level, the reason why the strategy is suboptimal is because often,
the losses we can inflict most effectively on the organization are precisely those losses
that the organization can restore most easily. Hence, in the long-term a strategy target-
ing strength S would be ineffective. Instead, when making a CT strategy it would be
valuable to understand the target organization’s dynamics, and in particular, to build
a dynamical model. Such a model would help because it can identify an organiza-
tion’s unique set of vulnerabilities due to the composition of its human capital and its
8Mathematically, this would be two variable minimization of S constrained by a budget.
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properties as a dynamical system.
6 Conclusions
Much of the benefit of mathematical models is due to their ability to elucidate the log-
ical implications of empirical knowledge that was used to construct the model. Thus,
whereas the empirical facts used to construct the models should be uncontroversial,
their conclusions should offer new insights. The model proposed here is a very simpli-
fied description of real terrorist organizations. Despite its simplicity, it leads to many
plausible predictions and policy recommendations. Indeed, the simplicity of the model
is crucial to making the model useful. More detailed models of this kind could provide
unparalleled insights into counter-terrorism policies and the dynamics of terrorism.
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A Appendix
The original differential equations are:
dL
dt
= pF − dL− b (1)
dF
dt
= r(mL+ F︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
)− dF − k (2)
If we wished to incorporate the drain of the foot soldiers due to promotion (−pF ) in
Eqn.2, then we could adjust the original parameters by the transformation r → r − p
and m → rmr−p . However, this would affect some of the analysis below, because for
r < p it would not longer be the case that r > 0, even though rm > 0 would still hold
true. Alternatively, we could change the internal losses parameter for foot soldiers :
dF → dF + p and break the condition dF = dL.
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The linearity of the system of differential equations makes it possible to analyze
the solutions in great detail by purely analytic means. The fixed point is at:
L∗ =
kp− b(r − d)
d(r − d) + rmp F∗ =
kd+ rmb
d(r − d) + rmp (3)
The eigenvalues at the fixed point are
λ1,2 =
r − 2d±√(r − 2d)2 + 4 (rmp+ d(r − d))
2
(4)
From Eqn.(4), the fixed point is a saddle when rmp+d(r−d) > 0, i.e. r−
√
r2+4rmp
2 <
d <
r+
√
r2+4rmp
2 (physically, the lower bound on d is 0). The saddle becomes a sink if
r < 2d and rmp+ d(r− d) < 0. By Eqn.(3), this automatically gives F∗ < 0, i.e. the
organization is destroyed9. It is impossible to obtain either a source because it requires
r − 2d > 0 and rmp+ d(r − d) < 0, but the latter implies d > r, and so r − 2d > 0
is impossible; or any type of spiral because (r − 2d)2 + 4(rmp + d(r − d)) < 0 is
algebraically impossible10. It is also interesting to find the eigenvectors because they
give the directions of the sink and trend lines:
e1,2 =
(
2p
r ±
√
r2 + 4rmp
)
(5)
We see that the slope of e2, which is also the slope of the sink line - the stable manifold -
is negative. Therefore, we conclude that the stable manifold encloses, together with the
axes, the region of neutralized organizations. Concurrently, the slope of e1 - the trend
line i.e. the unstable manifold - is positive. Thus, the top half of the stable separatrix
would point away from the axes, and gives the growth trend of all non-neutralized
organizations ( ∆F∆L =
r+
√
r2+4rmp
2p ).
A.1 Proof of the theorem
Recall, we wish to show that a terrorist organization that experiences both a decline
in its strength and a decline in the number of its foot soldiers will be destroyed. The
proof rests on two claims: First, a p-type organization cannot experience a decline in
strength, and second, an r-type organization cannot experience a decrease in F (for a
9Of course, the dynamical system is unrealistic once either F or L fall through zero. However, by the
logic of the model, once F reaches zero, the organization is doomed because it lacks a pool of foot soldiers
from which to rebuild inevitable losses in its leaders.
10The degenerate case of λ = 0 has probability zero, and is not discussed.
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graphic illustration see Fig. 7 below). Thus, both a decline in strength and a decline
in the number of foot soldiers cannot both occur in an r-type organization nor can they
both occur in a p-type organization. Hence, such a situation can only occur in the
region of defeated organizations.
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Figure 7 – The phase plane with possible (solid
blue) and impossible (dashed red) trajectories, and
lines of equal organization strength (green). Be-
cause orbits of the p-type must experience an in-
crease in strength S, the left red line cannot be an or-
bit. Also, r-type orbits must experience an increase
in F , and so the right red line cannot be an orbit
either.
As to the first claim, we be-
gin by showing that the slope of
the sink line is always greater
than the slope of the iso-strength
lines (= −m). By Eqn. (5)
the slope is r−
√
r2+4rmp
2p =
−m 2
1+
√
1+4mpr
> −m. There-
fore, the flow down the sink line
has dSdt > 0 (Down is the left-to-
right flow in the figure). Now,
we will show that in a p-type or-
ganization, the flow must expe-
rience an even greater increase
in strength. Let A be the matrix
of the dynamical system about
the equilibrium point and let the
state of the terrorist organization
be (L,F ) = d1e1 + d2e2 where
e1, e2 are the distinct eigenvec-
tors corresponding to the eigen-
values λ1, λ2. Consideration of
the directions of the vectors (Eqn.(5)) shows that for a p-type organization, d1 > 0 and
d2 < 0. The direction of flow is therefore d1λ1e1+d2λ2e2. Notice that λ1 > 0,λ2 < 0,
and so the flow has a positive component (= d1λ1) in the e1 direction (i.e. up the trend
line). Since the flow along e1 experiences an increase in both L and F , it must experi-
ence an increase in strength. Consequently, a p-type organization must have dSdt which
is even more positive than the flow along the sink line (where d1 = 0). Thus, dSdt > 0
for p-types.
As to the second claim, note that r-type organizations have d1 > 0 and d2 > 0.
Moreover, in an r-type organization, the flow d1λ1e1 + d2λ2e2 has dFdt greater than
for the flow up the right side of the sink line (right-to-left in the figure): the reason is
that e1 points in the direction of increasing F and while in an r-type d1 > 0, along the
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sink line d1 = 0. The flow up the sink line has dFdt > 0, and so
dF
dt > 0 in an r-type
organization. In sum, dSdt < 0 simultaneously with
dF
dt < 0 can only occur in the region
d1 < 0 - the region of defeated organizations. QED.
A.2 Concrete Example of Strength Minimization
In subsection 5.3 we claimed that the task of minimizing S is different from the optimal
counter-terrorism strategy. Here is a concrete example that quantitatively illustrates this
point. Suppose a resource budget B is to be allocated between fighting the leadership
and fighting the foot soldiers, and furthermore, that the cost of removing l leaders and
f foot soldiers, respectively, is a typical convex function: c1lσ + c2fσ (c1 and c2 are
some positive constants and σ > 1)11. Notice that whereas uppercase letters L,F
indicate the number of leaders and foot soldiers, respectively, we use lowercase l, f to
indicate the number to be removed. The optimal values of l and f can be easily found
graphically using the standard procedure in constrained optimization: the optimum is
the point of tangency between the curve B = c1lσ + c2fσ and the lines of constant
difference in strength: ∆S = ml + f = constant (Fig.8(a)).
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Figure 8 – Graphical calculation of optimal budget allocation (a) and contrast between
minimization of S and the actual optimum (b). In (a), the optimal choice of (l,m) is given
by the point of tangency between the feasible region and the lines of constant S. In (b), the
red line is the sink line. The minimization of S through the removal of about 20 leaders
and 400 foot soldiers would not bring the organization under the sink line, but a different
(still feasible) strategy would.
However, as illustrated in Fig. 8(b), if such a strategy is followed, the terrorist or-
ganization may still remain out of control. It is preferable to choose a different strategy
11σ > 1 because e.g. once the first say 20 easy targets are neutralized, it becomes harder to find and
neutralize the next 20 (the law of diminishing returns.) In any case the discussion makes clear that for most
cost functions the suggested optimum would be different from the true optimum.
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- in the example it is the strategy that focuses more on attacking the foot soldiers and
thus brings the organization under the sink line (red line), even though the ∆S is not as
large. In general, the difference between the strategies is represented by the difference
between the slope of the sink line and the slopes of the lines of equivalent damage to
strength. The latter always have slope −m while the former becomes arbitrarily flat as
p
r →∞.
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